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I. INTRODUCTION
Deep shale formations in the United States have long been known
to hold large quantities of gas and oil, but their low permeability made
energy extraction challenging and unprofitable. In recent years, oper-
ators combined two techniques to increase well productivity: horizon-
tal drilling, which exposes more shale rock to the wellbore; and
hydraulic fracturing, which injects large quantities of water mixed with
chemicals and sand at high pressure to create and prop open tiny frac-
tures that allow trapped gas and oil to flow into the wellbore (collec-
tively, fracking).1 Fracking, combined with the high price of natural
gas in the mid-2000s, set off a drilling boom that exposed more areas,
including heavily populated and environmentally sensitive areas, to
the risks associated with drilling activities. Debates about the desira-
bility of widespread shale development have highlighted outstanding
uncertainty about its health, safety, and environmental impacts—most
* Caroline Cecot is an Assistant Professor of Law at Antonin Scalia Law School
at George Mason University. I am grateful to Joni Hersch, Dana Nelson, Piotr Pilar-
ski, J.B. Ruhl, W. Kip Viscusi, and the participants of Environmental Protection: Car-
rots or Sticks? at the Texas A&M School of Law for helpful feedback. I also thank the
energy industry experts that helped me understand important aspects of oil and gas
drilling. Finally, I thank Heidi Hall for excellent research assistance.
1. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., DE-FE0004002, MOD-
ERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: AN UPDATE 11–12 (2013).
This Article refers to the application of both technologies, horizontal drilling and hy-
draulic fracturing, as fracking. These technologies have also been referred to as “frac-
ing.” Both horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing technologies are used to extract
oil or gas from unconventional, shale, or tight formations—but hydraulic fracturing is
also used with vertical wells drilled in conventional formations.
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prominently, its water-contamination risks—and the ability of current
institutions to deal with these impacts.2 States, the primary regulators
of oil and gas extraction, face pressure from the energy industry, local
communities, and, in some cases, the federal government to strike the
right balance between energy production and the health and safety of
individuals and the environment—an elusive balance given the ongo-
ing risk uncertainty. Concerns that current public and private risk-
management systems cannot deal with potential fracking-related risks
have led many towns, cities, and states to take a precautionary ap-
proach by banning fracking altogether.3 This dynamic is not especially
unique to fracking, or even oil and gas extraction; instead, this dy-
namic, characterized by tradeoffs between environmental protection
and economic development under risk uncertainty, is a common
theme of environmental risk regulation. Regulators at every level of
government weigh and evaluate potential interventions against this
background.
This Article contributes to a symposium held at Texas A&M School
of Law that explored the advantages and disadvantages of various
government interventions in the environmental context in an effort to
identify ideal risk-management tools under various circumstances.4
Federal and state governments have several tools at their disposal to
achieve environmental policy ends. Figure 1 presents some of the most
commonly discussed tools organized by degree of government in-
volvement and coercion, two important themes of the symposium.
2. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-732, OIL & GAS: INFORMATION
ON SHALE RESOURCES, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH
RISKS 39, 50 (2012).
3. See, e.g., Caroline Cecot, No Fracking Way: An Empirical Investigation of Lo-
cal Shale Development Bans in New York, 48 ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2018) (finding
that towns more vulnerable to water risks, among other things, were more likely to
adopt fracking bans in New York). According to the environmental group Food and
Water Watch, more than 400 communities across more than twenty states as well as
five states and the District of Columbia have adopted some anti-fracking measure. See
Local Resolutions Against Fracking, FOOD & WATER WATCH, http://www.foodand
waterwatch.org/insight/local-resolutions-against-fracking (last updated May 18, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/8EPS-75BV].
4. Environmental Protection: Carrots or Sticks? at Texas A&M School of Law on
March 9–10, 2018.
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FIGURE 1
Of course, the ideal tool depends on the context. And contributions to
this symposium discuss the potential usefulness of using command-
and-control options,5 tort liability,6 market-based mechanisms,7 and
public-private cooperation schemes8 in a variety of contexts. This Ar-
ticle highlights how, in some circumstances, the government should
deploy a combination of tools that would work in concert to manage
risk. In particular, it focuses on interventions that would help address
risks to water from fracking.
From an economic perspective, the goal of environmental policy
should be the level of environmental quality that maximizes aggregate
welfare. Then, the ideal tool is the one that would achieve that goal at
the lowest cost to society (including administrative, compliance, en-
forcement, and other costs). Identifying this tool or combination of
tools requires grappling with the nature of the specific environmental
externality, the incentives of various actors, and the comprehensive-
ness of existing regulation-based, market-based, or litigation-based
risk management. The most important considerations for identifying
risk-management tools in the environmental context, then, are risks,
incentives, and cost-benefit analysis. These cornerstone principles pro-
vide a useful framework for environmental policy in general, espe-
cially in situations that involve heterogeneous and uncertain risks. By
paying attention to risk, incentives, and cost-benefit analysis, govern-
ment regulators are more likely to promote optimal levels of environ-
mental quality and avoid unintended, or even perverse, consequences.
To demonstrate the usefulness of these concepts concretely, this Ar-
ticle applies them to the fracking context, focusing on the most promi-
nent risks from widespread shale development: risks to water from
5. See, e.g., Katrina M. Wyman, Unilateral Steps to End High Seas Fishing, 6 TEX.
A&M L. REV. 259 (2018).
6. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Drought and Public Necessity: Can a Common-
Law “Stick” Increase Flexibility in Western Water Law, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 77
(2018).
7. See, e.g., James Salzman et al., Payments for Ecosystem Services: Past, Present
and Future, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 199 (2018).
8. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Gilligan, Carrots and Sticks in Private Climate Govern-
ance, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 179 (2018).
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shale gas extraction. Among industry experts and regulators, the most
concerning risks relate to the potential for spills of fracking fluid—
which can contain hazardous chemicals—and drilling wastewater—
which can contain residual fracking fluid, brine, and naturally occur-
ring contaminants from the formation itself.9 There is considerable
uncertainty about the nature and magnitude of risks to water from
fracking itself or from spills of fracking-related fluids and disagree-
ment about the ability of private and public institutions to efficiently
and comprehensively manage the risks. This Article applies these
principles in order to identify risk-management gaps in current regula-
tory frameworks and suggest potential solutions.
The Article is organized as follows. Part II briefly defends the use-
fulness of the economic perspective for environmental policy in gen-
eral. Paying attention to risks, incentives, and cost-benefit analysis is
self-evident to those who subscribe to the economic perspective, be-
lieve that welfare maximization is an appropriate goal for environ-
mental policy, and think that government interventions can, in some
cases, improve aggregate welfare. Of course, these principles are sus-
ceptible to the criticisms of the economic perspective. Part III in-
troduces the context of shale development and categorizes the
relevant risks along two useful dimensions. Part IV examines the abil-
ity of current risk-management systems to manage the relevant risks.
The Article highlights several risk-management gaps and offers sug-
gestions on specific tools that can be used to address these gaps. In
particular, the Article argues that states could better manage the risks
to water from shale development by clarifying tort responsibility,
mandating specific insurance, using economic analysis to assess regu-
latory safeguards, and encouraging research.
II. DEFENDING ECONOMICS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Applying principles of welfare economics, economic theory identi-
fies the socially desirable level of environmental quality as the level
that maximizes aggregate welfare, as measured by the satisfaction of
individual preferences.10 In this way, the economic perspective pro-
9. See ALAN KRUPNICK ET AL., PATHWAYS TO DIALOGUE WHAT THE EXPERTS
SAY ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS OF SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT, RESOURCES
FOR THE FUTURE 36 (2013), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/Documents/RFF-Rpt-
PathwaystoDialogue_FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CHY-X87E]. The Article
does not address the risk of earthquakes from the disposal of fracking waste waters, a
risk that has been well-documented. See Induced Earthquakes, U.S. GEOLOGICAL
SURV., https://earthquake.usgs.gov/research/induced/myths.php [https://perma.cc/
VB8A-LKXJ]. That said, increased wastewater recycling could mitigate this risk. See
Nichola Groom, Fracking Water’s Dirty Secret—Recycling, SCI. AM., https://
www.scientificamerican.com/article/analysis-fracking-waters-dirty-secret/ [https://
perma.cc/LW2V-FY5F].
10. For a discussion of general welfare economics, see ANDREU MAS-COLELL,
MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 545–72
(1995). Some disagree on whether a human-focused approach is appropriate in the
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-1\TWL108.txt unknown Seq: 5 19-DEC-18 9:13
2018] REGULATORY FRACTURE PLUGGING 33
vides a way of organizing competing interests and considering difficult
tradeoffs. It identifies a specific and achievable goal for environmental
quality, and its intuitions can be supplemented with insights from
other perspectives.
Standard economic theory predicts that well-functioning free mar-
kets allocate scarce resources efficiently, without need for government
intervention. No one’s welfare can be improved without making
someone else worse off.11 And, assuming no market failure, the mar-
ket outcome also maximizes aggregate welfare.
But market failure can and does occur. One common market failure
involves unpriced effects on third parties, referred to as externalities.
The idea is that if the market took account of these effects, the wel-
fare-maximizing equilibrium outcome would actually have been
higher (positive externalities) or lower (negative externalities). In
some cases, an apparent externality can be internalized by private par-
ties, thereby correcting the market failure without any outside inter-
vention. For example, if transaction costs were small and property
rights were well-defined, private parties would bargain with each
other, and the unpriced effects would be priced, the externality elimi-
nated, and social welfare maximized.12 In the environmental context,
however, there are many situations where transaction costs are high
and property rights are incomplete, such as when water pollution af-
fects a large downstream population. Economic theory thus supports
government intervention that would lower transaction costs, define
property rights, or otherwise encourage market participants to inter-
nalize the effects of the externality.
Of course, although government intervention might be necessary to
achieve the optimal level of environmental quality when markets and
private bargaining fail, the actual intervention might not improve wel-
fare, or even environmental quality, as compared to the status quo.
Government intervention might itself be inefficient—under- or over-
environmental context and whether individual preference satisfaction is the proper
basis for social welfare. E.g., Mark Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84
YALE L.J. 205, 223–25 (1974); James Huffman, Governing America’s Resources: Fed-
eralism in the 1980’s, 12 ENVTL. L. 863, 863–90 (1982); Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution
and the Public Health, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 351, 366–69 (2000); Oliver A.
Houck, Noah’s Second Voyage: The Rights of Nature as Law, 31 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1,
33–34 (2017). For a more detailed account of contemporary welfare economics, see
MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENE-
FIT ANALYSIS (2011).
11. See VILFREDO PARETO, COURS D’E´CONOMIE POLITIQUE (1896) (explaining
this quality of the equilibrium market outcome, which is referred to as Pareto
efficiency).
12. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 19 (1960). Note
that the assignment of property rights does not affect the resulting output. Of course,
it determines which party makes payments and which party receives them, which is a
distributional concern, not an efficiency concern. See id. at 30.
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regulating.13 The economic perspective helps here, too, with its frame-
work for identifying the appropriate level of environmental quality.
And in choosing among tools for achieving this goal, the economic
perspective focuses on efficiency or cost-effectiveness by evaluating
which instrument is likely to achieve the identified policy goals at the
lowest possible cost to society, including overall implementation costs.
This inquiry could include any costs attributable to inefficiencies asso-
ciated with more government involvement as well as costs related to
enforcement and implementation.
In particular, cost-benefit analysis can be used to account for vari-
ous interests and shed light on social-welfare-improving policies. The
analysis converts the value of the expected benefits to the benefi-
ciaries of a policy and the expected costs to those who are burdened
by the policy into a monetary scale and attempts to maximize net ben-
efits.14 At the very least, it forces regulators to explicitly list, quantify,
and, when possible, monetize the expected effects and consider alter-
natives that might achieve similar goals at a lower cost. Cost-benefit
analysis can increase the efficiency of environmental policies regard-
less of the regulatory instrument that decision-makers ultimately
choose.15 This tool is gaining widespread acceptance, notwithstanding
lingering methodological challenges and opposition.16 Since at least
1981, cost-benefit analysis serves as the analytical framework for the
13. There is a large amount of literature on what is referred to as “government
failure.” See, e.g., CLIFFORD WINSTON, GOVERNMENT FAILURE VERSUS MARKET
FAILURE (2006). Some argue that the potential for government failure must be
weighed against the original market failure. E.g., Terry L. Anderson & Donald R.
Leal, Free Market Environmentalism: Hindsight and Foresight, 8 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 111, 123 (1998). Undoubtedly, as underscored by the public choice litera-
ture, an investigation into the various incentives of government actors is important.
But currently, there appears to be little empirical information about the prevalence
and magnitude of government failure in the environmental context.
14. In other words, it implements the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, favoring policies in
which the beneficiaries could theoretically compensate those burdened. In other
words, it expands the universe of welfare-improving policies beyond those identified
by the Pareto criterion, which favors policies that benefit at least one person while
making no other person worse off. For a welfare-based justification for cost-benefit
analysis that does not rely on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, see MATTHEW D. ADLER &
ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006).
15. Well-designed command-and-control policies that are informed by economic
principles might even be superior in some contexts to market-based policies. See, e.g.,
Wallace E. Oates, Paul R. Portney & Albert M. McGartland, The Net Benefits of
Incentive-Based Regulation: A Case Study of Environmental Standard Setting, 79 AM.
ECON. REV. 1233, 1241–42 (1989).
16. These criticisms have been well-documented, including the difficulty of quanti-
fying and monetizing certain impacts and the importance of distributional concerns
that are typically not included in the analyses. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, It Might
Have Been: Risk, Precaution and Opportunity Costs, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 6
(2006); ADLER, supra note 10, at 6; Scott Farrow, Incorporating Equity in Regulatory
and Benefit-Cost Analysis Using Risk Based Preferences, 31 RISK ANALYSIS 902,
902–04 (2011).
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design and evaluation of federal regulatory policy and wields wide in-
fluence on the stringency of federal environmental policy.17
This Article applies these economic principles to identify optimal
regulation of risks to water from shale development. The regulation of
shale development is left largely to the states.18 Unlike federal regula-
tion, state regulation is not governed by any cross-cutting analytical
framework such as cost-benefit analysis. In fact, the economic per-
spective, in general, has not gained as much influence in state
regulation.
III. FRACKING CONTEXT AND RISKS
As an initial matter, it is important to consider the existence and
nature of externalities in the shale development context. When prop-
erty owners possess both surface and mineral rights, an oil and gas
operator seeking to drill a well spanning several property tracts would
need to receive permission from all of the relevant property owners.19
Property owners typically accept rental and royalty payments from oil
and gas companies in exchange for leasing mineral rights to operators.
In deciding whether to lease mineral rights, a property owner weighs
these rental and royalty payments against the potential adverse envi-
ronmental, health, and safety effects of drilling on her property. After
weighing the private costs and benefits, the property owner decides
whether to enter into an oil and gas lease.
17. E.g., ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT 10–12
(Richard D. Morgenstern ed., Res. for the Future 1997); Thomas O. McGarity, A
Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 10, 15–16 (1998); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE
COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 9–12 (2002);
RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR
HEALTH 3–5 (2008). In fact, the tool of cost-benefit analysis, or at least an informal
version of the tool, is increasingly associated by courts with rational federal agency
decision-making. See Caroline Cecot & W. Kip Viscusi, Judicial Review of Agency
Benefit-Cost Analysis, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 575, 592–605 (2015) (examining how
courts review agency cost-benefit analysis); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis
and Arbitrariness Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2017) (arguing that, to
survive arbitrariness review, agencies should conduct reasonable cost-benefit
analysis).
18. This Article treats this distribution of authority as a given but acknowledges
that much ink has been spilled on the optimal jurisdictional allocation. See, e.g., David
B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Produc-
tion, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 435–47 (2013); Michael Burger, Fracking and Federalism
Choice, 161 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 150, 153–60 (2013).
19. In some instances, one party will own both the surface area and the mineral
estate beneath the land. However, if the surface rights and mineral estate rights have
been severed, these rights will be owned by different parties. In cases where mineral
rights and surface rights are held separately (a split-estate), it is even easier to con-
template the existence of externalities. But at least in some cases the surface owner
could negotiate compensation for protection from “unreasonable encroachment and
damage” to the surface. See ANTHONY ANDREWS, ET AL., UNCONVENTIONAL GAS
SHALES: DEVELOPMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLICY ISSUES, CONG. RES. SERV. 27
(2010).
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It is clear, then, that at least some of the risks of fracking can be,
and often are, internalized. The operator and the property owner
should negotiate until the royalty rate and the terms of the lease ade-
quately reflect (1) the expected economic rent; (2) characteristics of
the resource; (3)  competition for the lease, such as the number of
other producers offering leases in the area, and the number of other
nearby mineral owners currently negotiating with a producer; and
(4) environmental effects on the leaseholder’s property.20 At least one
empirical study of leases confirms that some contain environmental
clauses that encourage the use of safeguards to prevent contamination
of soil and water and noise clauses that require the use of mufflers
with loud equipment.21 The empirical analysis, however, also suggests
that concerns about information asymmetries and unequal bargaining
power are not out of place in this context.22
But even putting aside concerns about information and bargaining
power, it is equally clear that the lease agreement between the prop-
erty owner and the operator does not internalize all the effects on
water from shale development.23 The unprecedented scale of develop-
ment exposes more areas to ordinary risks associated with drilling ac-
tivities, including wastewater spills on the surface or methane leaks
due to improper well casing.24 Fracking might also present additional
risks, such as groundwater and surface water contamination from
fracking fluid or wastewater.25 These risks can easily extend beyond
the properties of the lessors. It is difficult to measure the extent of
these externalities. One study of Pennsylvania, where shale gas devel-
20. See The Basics: Mineral Rights, Royalties & Surface Use Agreements, COLO.
OIL & GAS ASS’N (2013), http://www.coga.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/3-
Basics_MineralRights.pdf [https://perma.cc/UPH7-36HU]; Christopher Timmins &
Ashley Vissing, Shale Gas Leases: Is Bargaining Efficient and What Are the Implica-
tions for Homeowners if it is Not? 2, 14 (Dept. of Econ., Duke Univ., Working Paper,
2014), http://public.econ.duke.edu/~timmins/Timmins_Vissing_11_15.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2SUW-2UTV]; Jayni Foley Hein & Caroline Cecot, Mineral Royalties: His-
torical Uses and Justifications, 28 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 27 (2017).
21. Timmins & Vissing, supra note 20, at 72.
22. See Jeffrey R. Ray, Shale Gas: Evolving Global Issues for the Environment,
Regulation, and Energy Security, 2 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RES. 75, 88–89 (2013). The
empirical study of leases also found that demographic factors are associated with ne-
gotiation power, with high-income mineral owners able to negotiate higher royalty
rates. Timmins & Vissing, supra note 20, at 40–41. To the extent that there are ineffi-
ciencies in the lease terms, some government involvement might improve outcomes.
For example, some states have enacted laws that guarantee a minimum royalty rate to
private landowners or otherwise regulate the calculation of royalty payments. See,
e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-21-17 (2009); 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 33 (1979); 58 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 33 (2012); 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 679–80, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-423(c) (2012).
But those issues are outside the scope of this Article. This Article focuses on the
regulation of environmental externalities.
23. See Ray, supra note 22. There may also be positive externalities from shale
development that are likely not internalized.
24. See Yusuke Kuwayama et. al, Water Quality and Quantity Impacts of Hydrau-
lic Fracturing, 2 CURRENT SUSTAINABLE/RENEWABLE ENERGY REP. 17, 22 (2015).
25. Id. at 20.
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opment is prevalent, estimated that an additional well pad drilled
within 1 km of a groundwater intake area for a community water sys-
tem increased shale gas-related contaminants by, on average, 1.5 to
2.7%.26 Nearby property owners who did not lease their mineral rights
would face these water-contamination risks of drilling activities. And
those who rely on private water wells for drinking water might be es-
pecially vulnerable to water risks.27 Another study estimated that
those living in Pennsylvania counties with shale development spent
more than $19 million on bottled water in 2010 due to perceived risks
to drinking water.28
As shale development increases and properties have multiple
nearby wells, the ability of property owners to negotiate a solution
with oil and gas operators diminishes. If the regulatory regime is not
comprehensive, then some property owners might face a version of
the prisoner’s dilemma: These property owners might prefer to avoid
oil and gas drilling on their lands—but only if their neighbors also do
not allow oil and gas drilling on their lands. But if their neighbors
allowed drilling, then they would rather allow drilling, too. Otherwise,
these property owners would bear the costs of the drilling in the form
of unmitigated risks and uncompensated damages and would gain
none of the rewards in the form of royalty and rental payments. If
these types of property owners constitute a majority in a locality, then
they might decide to ban drilling altogether.29 In fact, in other re-
search, I found evidence that suggests concern about risks to water
has motivated some banning behavior.30 Given that shale develop-
ment is thought to have positive externalities beyond the local level,31
welfare could be improved by avoiding bans through more compre-
hensive regulation of externalities that would mitigate risks or com-
pensate damages. In 2012, the International Energy Agency warned
firms to support regulations that deal convincingly with environmental
risks of fracking—which it estimated would raise production costs by
26. Elaine Hill & Lala Ma, Shale Gas Development and Drinking Water Quality,
107 AM. ECON. REV. 522, 522 (2017).
27. See id. at 22. Unlike with the public water system, states do not regulate pri-
vate water wells, leaving it up to the homeowner to ensure that the water supply is
safe for consumption. Property owners who rely on private water wells, therefore,
would be expected to have a higher probability of realizing poor water quality if a
nearby well damages water sources.
28. Douglas H. Wrenn et al., Unconventional Shale Gas Development, Risk Per-
ceptions, and Averting Behavior: Evidence from Bottled Water Purchases, 3 J. ASS’N
ENVTL. & RES. ECONOMISTS 779, 779 (2016).
29. See generally Cecot, supra note 3, at 4 (describing circumstances under which
localities might ban fracking).
30. Id. at 3 (finding that shale-rich New York towns with a higher reliance on
private water wells and those with higher livestock water use were associated with a
higher probability of adopting a ban during 2010–2013).
31. Id. at 5–6 (discussing claims that development boosts state economies, pro-
motes energy security (if homegrown shale gas replaces imported conventional oil),
and reduces global greenhouse gas emissions (if shale gas replaces coal)).
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about seven percent—or else face widespread bans and other limits
that would ultimately prove more expensive.32
Under these circumstances, there should be some voluntary self-
regulation within the industry. And, in fact, the American Petroleum
Institute has developed a set of industry “best practices,”33 and one
organization offers certification to Appalachian Basin operators for
compliance with a set of water and air performance standards based
on “leading industry practices.”34 But while this type of voluntary self-
regulation could account for some of the ordinary risks associated
with oil and gas activities, it would likely not account for the uncertain
risks associated with fracking or those resulting in harm that manifests
later, where causation is difficult to prove.35
Against this background, this Article considers the role of govern-
ment intervention. Whether a tool, or combination of tools, is appro-
priate depends on the nature of the risk that the government seeks to
control or mitigate. To simplify some of the considerations, I catego-
rize the potential harms from shale development into four groups
(Categories I, II, III, and IV) broadly based on the timing of pollution
discharges and the manifestation of harms. Figure 2 summarizes these
risks.
32. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK: GOLDEN RULES FOR A
GOLDEN AGE OF GAS 42, 53 (2012), available at http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/
goldenrules/ [https://perma.cc/4CFN-LARW].
33. Overview of Industry Guidance/Best Practices on Hydraulic Fracturing (HF),
AM. PETROLEUM INST. (2012), available at http://www.api.org/~/media/files/policy/ex-
ploration/hydraulic_fracturing_infosheet.ashx [https://perma.cc/LAK3-TGPE].
34. Certification, CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE SHALE DEV., http://www.responsible
shaledevelopment.org/what-we-do/certification/ [https://perma.cc/CXW2-MWBS].
35. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy Rabinowitz, Voluntary Regulatory
Compliance in Theory and Practice: The Case of OSHA, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 97,
99–100, 155 (2000) (discussing incentives that underlie voluntary regulation and con-
cluding it is unlikely to be efficient in most cases).
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FIGURE 2
A Typology of Water-Contamination Harms from Shale Development
Incident Type →
Harm Discovery/ Sudden Gradual
Manifestation
Category I: Spills, discharges, Category II: Slowly leaking
or blowouts on-site waste storage pits
Pathways: Some fracturing Pathways: Some fracturing;
Immediate
process (improper well cas- storage; some disposal
ing); blowouts; some storage/
transport; some wastewater
disposal
Category III: Spills, dis- Category IV: Leaking pits,
charges, or blowouts found to disposal wells, or unplugged
generate latent harms abandoned wells that gener-
ate later harms
Delayed
Pathways: Fracking fluid flow-
(latent harms)
ing into natural fault lines in Pathways: Unplugged aban-
the local geology; any blow- doned wells with later leaks;
outs, spills or leaks linked to later leaking disposal wells;
latent health harms improper wastewater disposal
linked to latent health harms;
gas seeping into natural fault
lines in the local geology
In this categorization, Category I risks stem from sudden releases,
such as accidental spills, discharges, or blowouts that can contaminate
nearby soil or water. Category II risks stem from gradual releases,
such as slowly leaking on-site wastewater storage pits that can con-
taminate nearby soil or water. Both Category I and II risks are most
likely to occur through surface spills from drilling activities. For exam-
ple, fracking wastewater is often stored in on-site pits, at least tempo-
rarily, and then transported for treatment or injection into a disposal
well. Spills could occur when wastewater is transported, or when it is
improperly enclosed in storage containers. In fact, leaks and spills
often occur at drilling sites, as information on well violations demon-
strates.36 If spills or leaks are not cleaned up, then contaminants might
be able to migrate into groundwater sources. These risks to water—
from fracking chemical and wastewater spills—were identified by in-
36. In Pennsylvania, the Department of Environmental Protection tracks spills
and other violations. Using this information, researchers have identified almost 150
violations for minor spills (spilling less than 40 gallons) and nine violations for major
spills in Pennsylvania between January 2008 and August 2011. Timothy J. Considine et
al., THE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES OF SHALE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT, CTR. EN-
ERGY POL’Y & ENV’T 9 (2011), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/eper_09.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S8LF-YR4U].
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dustry experts and regulators as the most pressing fracking risks,37 and
such spills might already be causing contamination.38 Under federal
law, operators must report qualifying spills of hazardous substances.39
States, however, are responsible for ensuring that proper regulations
are in place to prevent such spills, and these state regulations vary
widely.40 These risks manifest in immediate harms to water sources
and are not very different from the water risks presented by all on-
shore drilling activities, not just shale development.
Category III and IV risks are characterized by uncertain pathways
and latent harms. A large proportion of these risks include the uncer-
tain risks of shale development, such as the risk of pollutants moving
through fracture systems over the course of years to enter a water
source (Category III) or the risk that individuals may develop cancers
because of previous exposures to pollution (Category III or IV).
These risks are very salient to many, but there has not yet been much
evidence to substantiate them. Some of these future harms relate to
well completion and abandonment procedures or to wastewater dispo-
sal. If adequate procedures are not in place to seal wells, then these
wells may develop leaks and gradually discharge pollution over time
into the surrounding soil or water (Category IV). Resulting harms are
likely to involve property and environmental damage but may also
include allegations of adverse health effects, such as cancers caused by
long-ago contamination events.
IV. EVALUATING FRACKING RISK-MITIGATION SYSTEMS
Typically, when a socially beneficial activity generates externalities,
governments consider several risk-management tools. These were
roughly summarized in Figure 1. This Article focuses on three catego-
ries of tools that could complement each other to regulate risks to
water from shale development: tort, insurance, and regulation. Private
parties initiate tort litigation to seek compensation for harms allegedly
caused by other parties, thereby also regulating private behavior. But
government legislation should clarify the scope of tort liability, and
government agencies should issue cost-benefit justified regulations to
complement tort liability. Liability insurance is a market tool available
to companies to manage risks from their activities. Governments
should mandate liability insurance coverage, ensuring that only com-
panies that are able to pay for expected damages engage in an activity.
But I argue that such interventions would only adequately address
37. KRUPNICK ET AL., supra note 9, at 46.
38. See Hill & Ma, supra note 26, at 522.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (2012).
40. NATHAN RICHARDSON, ET AL., THE STATE OF STATE SHALE GAS REGULA-
TION, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 1 (June 2013), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/
WorkImages/Download/RFF-Rpt-StateofStateRegs_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ST4R-2W8A].
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Category I and II risks. For other categories of risks, governments
should encourage research into uncertain risk pathways. Although
others have proposed deploying one or more of these tools to regulate
the risks to water of shale development,41 I argue that effective regu-
lation requires using a combination of these tools to address all risk
categories.
A. Strengthening Tort Liability
Tort litigation could manage at least some risks to water from shale
development. Tort law considers harms that occur outside of contrac-
tual relationships, determining injurer liability and victim compensa-
tion. By making injurers pay for harms, a well-functioning tort system
would ensure that potential defendants take only those actions in
which the benefits exceed the costs, similar to the incentives imposed
by a rational regulatory system. Tort law is a good starting point be-
cause if an adverse event takes place, successful litigation provides
compensation to affected parties. Additionally, litigation might be
more efficient than regulation; it does not require government regula-
tors to acquire information on costs and benefits ex ante.42 Of course,
tort litigation is notorious for its limitations in managing environmen-
tal externalities.43 This Section argues that states can increase the ef-
fectiveness of the tort system to manage some of the risks to water
from shale development through legislation or regulation that would
clarify liability, limit judgment-proof operators, and make it easier for
plaintiffs to establish causation.
Property owners seeking redress for water contamination from
fracking typically bring four common law causes of action: negligence,
strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities, private nuisance,
and trespass. This Article focuses on the first two causes of action.44
Generally speaking, in order to establish a defendant’s liability, the
tort plaintiff must present prima facie evidence showing that (1) the
41. David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to Regulating the
Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and Uncertain Risks
of Hydraulic Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1523, 1528–29 (2014); Thomas W. Merrill &
David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water
Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 145, 197, 245 (2013).
42. Potential defendants, however, must still assess the expected costs of their ac-
tions—but it is likely that they possess better information about the harms they might
inflict. That said, studies of tort litigation have found it to be inefficient. See, e.g., Joni
Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Tort Liability Litigation Costs for Commercial Claims, 9
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 330, 330 (2007) (finding that on average the total transaction
costs for each dollar received by claimants are $0.75 for all claims and $0.83 for liti-
gated claims).
43. See, e.g., Peter Menell, The Limitations of Legal Institutions for Addressing
Environmental Risks, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (1991).
44. Trespass cases involving movement of things from the fracking process have
generally been denied. See, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268
S.W.3d 1, 4–5 (Tex. 2008). But cases alleging unauthorized horizontal drilling under
properties may be more viable.
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plaintiff suffered harm and (2) the defendant’s activity caused the
harm. Courts typically apply one of two liability standards: negligence
(the default in many contexts) or strict liability. Under a negligence
rule, the plaintiff would additionally need to show that the defendant
owed and violated a duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff when en-
gaging in the activity for courts to impose liability on the defendant. In
contrast, a strict liability standard imposes liability on defendants for
all the harms their actions cause, regardless of whether the defendants
are negligent.
Theoretically, either form of liability can result in defendants taking
the socially optimal level of care, defined as that which minimizes to-
tal social costs after considering the costs of exercising care and the
reduction in accident risks.45 Strict liability, however, would ease the
court’s decision-making task by removing the comparison of the de-
fendant’s level of care to society’s optimal level. It might also make
sense to hold operators strictly liable for harms because operators
may have easier access to insurance to pay for environmental harms
that occur even when they take reasonable care. Homeowner policies
tend to not cover contamination risks of nearby shale development,
but insurers can purchase specialized coverage to cover third-party
harms, as discussed in the next Section. Finally, strict liability has the
added benefit of discouraging excessive activity levels.46 Because op-
erators do not pay for resulting harms when they take due care under
a negligence rule, they increase their activity levels so long as the ben-
efits of additional activity outweigh their costs of taking due care.
Under a strict liability rule, however, operators choose an activity
level where their net utility (benefits minus costs of care) is higher
than total expected harms, which is the socially optimal level of
activity.47
Typically, defendants that engage in “abnormally dangerous” or
“ultrahazardous” activities are held to a strict liability standard.48 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts lists several factors for courts to con-
sider when determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous,
including the existence of risks and likelihood of harm; the ability to
eliminate risks by exercising reasonable care; and the extent to which
the activity’s value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
45. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 181
(2004).
46. Id. at 197.
47. If regulations exist, compliance with net beneficial regulatory standards should
prevent the assessment of punitive damages against the operator even if compliance
does not absolve the operator from liability for harms.
48. Abnormally Dangerous Activity, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.
edu/wex/abnormally_dangerous_activity (last visited July 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
S4GM-FABA]; Ultrahazardous Activity, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.
edu/wex/ultrahazardous_activity (last visited July 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/H4RQ-
TA52].
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attributes.49 So far, only one court—the Middle District of Penn-
sylvania—has addressed whether fracking is an abnormally dangerous
activity that gives rise to strict tort liability for water contamination
under state common law.50 After noting that oil and gas drilling is not
generally deemed abnormally dangerous and applying the factors to
fracking, the court concluded that fracking, too, is not abnormally
dangerous, at least based on the record in that case. Therefore, it held
that “traditional negligence principles” would apply to the plaintiffs’
claims for property damage and personal injury due to water
contamination.51
Thus, for strict liability to apply, states would likely have to estab-
lish such liability through legislation. This could be similar to what the
federal government currently does for sites contaminated with hazard-
ous substances (referred to as Superfund sites) under the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(“CERCLA”).52 Specifically, CERCLA imposes strict liability for
contamination by hazardous substances on current operators or own-
ers of sites, past operators or owners, transporters of hazardous sub-
stances, and disposal arrangers.53 To the extent not preempted by
CERCLA, states could create similar strict liability systems for shale
operators, where any spill of fracking fluid or wastewater could trigger
cleanup responsibility.54 Additionally, states could similarly make
more parties potentially responsible for cleanups, thereby producing
incentives for other involved parties to monitor the activities of those
with whom they choose to work.
Without such state intervention, tort claims would likely continue to
fall under the negligence standard, requiring courts to determine the
defendant’s level of care and calculate the socially optimal level of
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). The Restatement (Third) of
Torts simplifies the conditions for imposing strict liability, focusing on the risk of
physical harm even when reasonable care is exercised. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 (2010).
50. See Blake Watson, Hydraulic Fracturing Tort Litigation Summary, UNIV. DAY-
TON SCH. L. (May 22, 2018), https://udayton.edu/directory/law/documents/watson/
blake_watson_hydraulic_fracturing_primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/FW42-2YTX].
51. Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 38 F. Supp. 3d 518, 520 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2012).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2012).
54. Some fracking-related spills may already trigger CERCLA liability. Fracking
fluid contains about 0.5–2% of chemical additives, some of which could be considered
hazardous substances. And, if so, a sizeable spill of the fluid on the surface might
trigger reporting requirements and emergency response action under CERCLA. But
spills of oil and gas do not trigger these requirements because CERCLA exempts oil
and natural gas from the definition of a hazardous substance. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)
(2012). In addition, the purposeful injection of fracking fluids for well stimulation is
not federally regulated. In the 2005 Energy Policy Act, Congress amended the defini-
tion of “underground injection” under the Safe Drinking Water Act to exclude the
injection of fracking fluid in the fracking operation itself, unless the fracking fluid
contains diesel. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1) (2005).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-1\TWL108.txt unknown Seq: 16 19-DEC-18 9:13
44 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
care. Here, too, economics-based government interventions could
play a valuable complementary role. If courts apply a negligence rule
to drilling operators, a set of net beneficial regulations would ease the
court’s decision-making task; the court could look to whether the de-
fendant violated relevant regulations.55
State regulators should use cost-benefit analysis to inform these reg-
ulations, focusing on flexible standards and taking into account local
impacts and preferences.56 Compliance with these regulations would
create a presumption that the defendant exercised reasonable care,
subject to rebuttal by the plaintiff. To keep calculations tractable, the
regulations should focus on avoiding immediate environmental exter-
nalities—in other words, those caused by Category I and II risks to
water. These risks are known and quantifiable to a large extent based
on data from the last decade of shale development, as well as decades
of conventional onshore oil and gas drilling. In addition, there are re-
sources available to states to help ensure that their regulations cover
most sources of immediate risks.57 State regulators could also solicit
information from industry experts to help calculate costs.58 Impor-
tantly, the regulations should take the form of flexible performance
standards to ensure that no specific technology is enshrined in an in-
dustry characterized by fast-paced technological innovation and devel-
opment. The standards might be more stringent in states where the
potential benefits of risk mitigation are higher, such as states with
more people who rely on private water wells for drinking water.59 At
55. Merrill and Schizer propose a regulation-and-tort integrated system for man-
aging the risks of shale development. See Merrill & Schizer, supra note 41, at 239–46.
But they urge regulations to adopt best practices based on best-available technolo-
gies. But the adoption of such technologies might not maximize net benefits. In addi-
tion, technology-based regulations are particularly concerning in a field founded on
fast-paced technological innovation.
56. For example, an agency could issue baseline regulations and then condition
site-specific permits on additional risk-mitigation practices tailored to local condi-
tions. This is similar to what New York was considering before the state decided to
ban shale development. See Revised Draft Supplemental Generic Environmental Im-
pact Statement on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Regulatory Program, N.Y. ST.
DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION 21–26 (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/
dmn/rdsgeisfull0911.pdf [https://perma.cc/S46F-HS57].
57. The State Review of Oil and Natural Gas Environmental Regulations, Inc.
(“STRONGER”), a nonprofit, multi-stakeholder organization with expertise in oil
and gas regulations, offers a voluntary review of state oil and gas laws and regulations,
including fracking-specific regulations, but so far, only six states have availed them-
selves of the fracking-specific regulatory review. Past Reviews, STRONGER (2018),
http://www.strongerinc.org/past-reviews   (last visited June 16, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
2NNF-PYAY].
58. Concern about regulatory capture that might lead to less-stringent regulations
would be mitigated if regulation is supplemented with tort liability that would hold
operators responsible for all damages from drilling activities. Comprehensive tort lia-
bility will provide incentives that push regulators to adopt cost-effective operating
practices.
59. So far, however, researchers have not found many statistically significant as-
sociations between observed regulatory heterogeneity and environmental and demo-
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the very least, operators should be encouraged to justify their drilling
practices with cost-benefit analysis during any litigation; state regula-
tion could ensure that an operator’s well-conducted cost-benefit anal-
ysis could inform the standard of care.
Clarifying or defining the liability standard could reduce transaction
costs associated with tort litigation and promote efficient settlement of
claims. But there are several other ways that government intervention
could ensure that the tort system acts as an efficient risk-mitigation
scheme beyond defining liability standards. First, it could tackle the
well-known problem of judgment-proof injurers.60 These injurers face
diminished incentives to mitigate risks because even if disaster ensues
and victims sue, the injurers will not be able to pay for damages by
compensating the victims and remediating harms. Reports already
suggest that smaller operators are, on average, more likely to incur
violations during drilling.61 Regulatory interventions could prohibit
judgment-proof drilling operators. Specifically, regulators could re-
quire operators to purchase environmental impairment liability insur-
ance coverage for Category I and II risks (covering immediate injury,
property, and cleanup costs from both accidental sudden and gradual
releases of pollution), as discussed in the next Section. This would
guarantee that only operators that are able to pay for expected imme-
diate harms, reasonable care notwithstanding, engage in drilling
activities.
Second, it is difficult for plaintiffs to prove that the defendant’s ac-
tions caused the harm in tort claims involving water contamination
from drilling activities.62 Sudden or gradual pollution spills at drilling
sites, for example, can cause contamination of nearby water sources,
but contamination can also be naturally present or be due to other
human activities, such as the use of pesticides in agriculture. Even if
drilling activities cause contamination, multiple operators can contrib-
ute to the contamination, making it difficult to hold any one company
at fault. Clear rules may provide some relief by creating default liabil-
ity under certain conditions. For example, states could require opera-
tors to provide baseline test results if they want to allege preexisting
contamination in a water source. This is essentially the liability rule in
Pennsylvania, promoting baseline testing of nearby water wells with-
graphic variables. See RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 16 (suggesting room for
improvement).
60. SHAVELL, supra note 45, at 233.
61. Daniel Gilbert & Russell Gold, As Big Drillers Move In, Safety Goes Up,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 2, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873245828
04578346741120261384 [https://perma.cc/VM3W-22JA].
62. Judith H. Jordan, Proving Whether or Not Contamination Is Caused by Oil and
Gas Operations, ENVTL. & ENERGY L. SEC. NEWSL. 1 (July 2011), https://
www.pabar.org/public/sections/envco/pubs/newsletters/2011-07-25-NewsletterV1E2-
Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5J6-JEWH]; Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing Con-
tamination Claims: Problems of Proof, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 71, 73 (2012).
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out explicitly requiring baseline testing.63 As of now, only eight states
require operators to test nearby water wells prior to drilling.64 Texas
and Oklahoma, states with significant shale development, have no
such requirements.65 Noncompliance with testing requirements could
play a role in determining tort liability as it does in Pennsylvania—
that is, operators that fail to test wells prior to drilling could be pre-
sumptively liable for any contamination—thereby decreasing some of
the difficulties plaintiffs have in proving causation. States could also
consider changing the requirements for establishing causation, such as
by acknowledging the probabilistic nature of causation in situations
involving multiple causal factors.66
Although such strategies might reduce some of the difficulty in
proving causation, they are unlikely to help plaintiffs that seek to es-
tablish causation between latent harms and shale development (Cate-
gory III and IV risks). Courts may be hesitant to hold operators
responsible for contamination or contamination-related harms that
are discovered or manifest long after drilling has ceased. The amount
of time that has elapsed also increases the likelihood that other factors
contributed to the harm. Potential plaintiffs will not have the neces-
sary resources to support scientific research, and judges and juries will
not have the expertise to evaluate the research. Proactive research
into these risk pathways would support causation for true latent harms
that might feature in future tort litigation.67
63. Jon Hurdle, Science Panel Faults EPA Fracking Probe for Excluding Baseline
Water Testing, STATEIMPACT PA. (Jan. 13, 2016, 6:06 PM), https://stateimpact.npr.org/
pennsylvania/2016/01/13/science-panel-faults-epa-fracking-probe-for-excluding-base-
line-water-testing/ [https://perma.cc/WWL6-QG48].
64. RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 30.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Glen O. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for
Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 784 (1985).
67. If states fail to support such research, tort litigation might still play a useful,
albeit costly, role in mobilizing research into latent harms. This could arise if future
juries award large damages to plaintiffs when there is little scientific evidence to dis-
pute causation. Such occurrences have been documented in previous tort litigation.
For example, after a prominent tort case in which the plaintiff alleged latent harms
from her silicone breast implants, two jurors indicated after the decision that while
they did not think that silicone caused the plaintiff’s disease, they awarded her $5.2
million in compensation because she was sick and needed the money and because
there was no evidence that silicone was safe. See Joni Hersch, Breast Implants: Regu-
lation, Litigation, and Science, in REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 142, 142 (W.
Kip Viscusi, ed., 2002). Such litigation could even prod the federal government into
action. Id. (documenting how the FDA had not required implant manufacturers to
provide any information on the long-term safety of implants and did not initiate any
such studies until after numerous plaintiffs had won multimillion dollar awards
through tort litigation). But so far, there has not been such an influx of high jury
awards. In the one large jury award for damages relating to fracking-related water
contamination in Pennsylvania—where the jury awarded $4.24 million—the district
judge vacated the award and ordered a new trial after determining that the evidence
was insufficient to support that award. See e.g., Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No.
3:09-CV-2284, 2017 WL 1196510, at *1–2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2017).
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B. Mandating Insurance
As some scholars have suggested, insurance could also play a role in
comprehensive management of risks to water from shale develop-
ment.68 Insurance requires companies to pay premiums before any
harms occur, thus forcing companies to “save” money in advance to
pay for future harms. When clear regulatory standards are in place
and when tort liability is well defined, a liability-insurance regime can
successfully mitigate environmental risk and ensure that funds are
available to compensate victims and remediate the environment.
At first glance, the risk-mitigation benefits of insurance are counter-
intuitive. Liability insurance is actually a solution to the problem of
risk-averse potential injurers either exercising too much care to avoid
liability or avoiding the activity altogether when they face strict liabil-
ity for harms. Both excessive care and suboptimal activity levels re-
duce social welfare. Therefore, the usual benefit of liability insurance
is that injurers could be risk neutral instead of risk averse and gener-
ate an optimal (i.e., higher) level of risk. Additionally, purchasing in-
surance could diminish the insured’s incentives for risk reduction, a
phenomenon referred to as moral hazard.69 Essentially, a party (the
insured) may take on more risks when another party (the insurer) be-
comes the one responsible for paying for the consequences of the
risks.
Hence, the role of insurance in risk mitigation is not a foregone
conclusion. The key conditions for insurers to function as pseudo-risk
regulators are their ability to base favorable premiums on the use of
sound operating practices and to monitor policyholders to ensure
compliance. Scholars disagree about whether insurers monitor compli-
ance,70 but arguably, if claim payment is conditional on complying
with sound practices, and if tort litigation generally reveals the actions
taken by the operator prior to an accidental release of pollution, then
policyholders would have incentives to adhere to insurance condi-
tions. But, even then, the insurer must base premiums on compliance
with some set of operating practices.
68. Dana & Wiseman, supra note 41, 1546–47 (arguing for insurance mandates).
69. Shaila Dewan, Moral Hazard: A Tempest-Tossed Idea, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25,
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/business/moral-hazard-as-the-flip-side-of-
self-reliance.html [https://perma.cc/PE33-AQM5].
70. Some scholars point to examples where such monitoring occurs and improves
outcomes, see Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How In-
surance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197 (2012), while others argue
that insurers’ monitoring capacity and history have been overstated, see Kenneth S.
Abraham, Catastrophic Oil Spills and the Problem of Insurance, 64 VAND. L. REV.
1769 (2011). At least one energy insurance provider, Energi, Inc., has revealed to
media that its underwriting process does include a compliance audit of a client’s oper-
ations to ensure that safety and loss-prevention standards are followed. Peter Behr,
Insurance Issues Loom Over Shale Gas Development, E&E ENERGYWIRE (Aug. 1,
2013), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1059985449 [https://perma.cc/G8VF-S9SQ].
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Once again, the existence of cost-benefit-justified regulatory stan-
dards could enhance the beneficial properties of insurance. Specifi-
cally, premiums could be conditioned on the net-beneficial regulations
discussed in the previous Section.71 This would ensure that the result-
ing standard of care would continue to be the socially optimal stan-
dard of care. This system, however, would generally not work well for
Category III and IV risks to water; state cost-benefit-justified regula-
tions are unlikely to address those risks given the uncertainties in-
volved. But, as discussed later in this Section, this gap is not relevant
in this context as insurance should not be required to cover latent
harms. Finally, an insurance mandate can improve compensation out-
comes by barring judgment-proof operators from engaging in drill-
ing.72 The insurance requirement would need to be set at an optimal
coverage amount equal to the expected value of tort harms; otherwise,
it might deter too many firms from entering the market.
There are several types of insurance plans available today that can
be used to control some of the water-contamination risks of fracking
and drilling in general. First, there are traditional commercial general
liability (“CGL”) policies. These policies provide liability protection
for damages from accidental events (including pollution discharges)
that occurred during the policy period (“occurrence-based” cover-
age).73 Largely due to expanded environmental liability exposure and
broad interpretations of the term “accident,” CGL policies became
stingier over time with their coverage of environmental liability. Basi-
cally, environmental liability can attach to injuries or damages that do
not manifest until years after the liability-producing accidental pollu-
tion release (such as Category III and IV risks to water). The emer-
gence of a “long tail” on claims made it difficult for insurers to predict
overall liability.74 CGL policies began to contain a “pollution exclu-
sion” that precludes liability coverage for damages caused by the dis-
charge of pollution unless the discharge was “sudden and accidental.”
But because courts have allowed unexpected gradual discharge of pol-
lutants to count as “sudden and accidental” discharges, some CGL
71. Again, if monitoring is an issue, insurers could also condition favorable premi-
ums on maintaining a low record of violations of state regulations, which would
achieve similar compliance objectives.
72. Some scholars have argued that the availability of insurance may also improve
compensation outcomes by (1) making courts more comfortable with holding compa-
nies responsible for the environmental harms caused by their activities, see generally
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM
THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 (2008); (2) making injured parties more likely to sue,
see Dana & Wiseman, supra note 41, at 1592; and (3) transferring payment to victims
more efficiently, see PAUL K. FREEMAN & HOWARD KUNREUTHER, MANAGING EN-
VIRONMENTAL RISK THROUGH INSURANCE 98–99 (1997).
73. ABRAHAM, supra note 72, at 155–70 (describing more thoroughly the emer-
gence and evolution of CGL policies).
74. Id. at 152.
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policies now contain an “absolute pollution exclusion,” which removes
the “sudden and accidental” exception.75
Instead of standard-form occurrence-based liability coverage for ac-
cidental pollution discharges, operators can purchase specialized poli-
cies that cover liability and cleanup costs associated with pollution
discharges. These policies are generally referred to as environmental
impairment liability (“EIL”) insurance policies, and there are oil-and-
gas-specific EIL policies. These specialized policies cover bodily in-
jury, property damage, and remediation expenses, but they often only
provide coverage on a “claims-made” basis, meaning that the policies
only cover damages from qualifying pollution events claimed during
the policy period. For example, a specialized EIL policy would cover
damages from the contamination of a private water well by fracking
wastewater that leaked from a storage container located on a well
site—if the claim for the loss was made and reported during the policy
period. The claims-based coverage cut off the difficult-to-insure long
tail, providing no coverage for later liability for long-latency harms
from a pollution release that occurred during the policy period.
These policy coverage descriptions suggest that traditional CGL
policies are likely to cover Category I and III risks as long as the poli-
cies do not contain an absolute pollution exclusion.76 However, once
the CGL policy contains an absolute pollution exclusion, the policy
might not cover any water-contamination risks. By contrast, special-
ized EIL policies are likely to cover Category I and II risks, but they
are unlikely to cover any risks with latent harms77 and any that in-
volve the possibility of delayed detection. Figure 3 summarizes the
possible coverage.
75. The stingiest CGL policies include a “total pollution exclusion.” IRMI.com, an
insurance resource, provides more detailed information about these policies and ex-
clusions. INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., http://www.irmi.com (last visited May 30, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/LXF5-5F3Y].
76. It is possible, however, that some policies are written to exclude some of the
risks of fracking, such as damages stemming from contamination by fracking fluid.
77. Unless insurers are made liable for medical monitoring expenses for potential
future manifestations of disease or illness when the claim is made at the time of the
accident.
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FIGURE 3
Insurance Coverage for Risk Categories by Insurance Plan
Category Category Category Category
I II III IV
CGL YES MAYBE YES MAYBE
CGL with pollution exclusion YES NO YES NO
CGL with absolute pollution exclusion NO NO NO NO
EIL YES YES NO NO
Notes. CGL refers to commercial general liability insurance plans. EIL refers to environmental
impairment liability insurance plans. A “pollution exclusion” precludes liability coverage for
damages caused by the discharge of pollution unless the discharge was “sudden and accidental.”
An “absolute pollution exclusion” removes the “sudden and accidental” exception.
Broadly speaking, insurance is available to cover some water-con-
tamination risks of drilling, especially fracking. Most drilling operators
carry CGL policies, but few purchase additional EIL insurance, and
those who do may not purchase enough coverage.78 Of course, an op-
erator could choose not to purchase insurance and self-insure against
all environmental risks. When an operator is large enough, self-insur-
ance is a viable strategy. Self-insurance, however, is unlikely to be a
viable strategy for small- to medium-sized operators given that dam-
ages from water-contamination events are in the millions. Notably, re-
ports suggest that smaller operators are, on average, more likely to
incur violations during drilling.79
But before mandating any form of liability insurance, state regula-
tors should examine why operators are not purchasing insurance in
their area. It could be that operators are not being held liable for im-
mediate environmental harms in tort claims, which could suggest
problems in the state’s tort-liability regime that should be separately
addressed. As discussed in the previous Section, causation hurdles in
tort claims make it challenging for plaintiffs to prove their cases—that
drilling activities caused their damages. Operators will not choose to
pay premiums for coverage that they do not think they will use.
It could also be that operators are not willing to purchase insurance
because premiums are too high relative to expected damages. Econo-
mists Freeman and Kunreuther document that the ambiguity of risks
plays a role when insurers decide what premium to charge—more am-
biguous risks lead to higher premiums.80 One source of risk ambiguity
78. One insurer estimates that only about 30–40% of oil and gas companies buy
EIL policies. Douglas Mcleod, Insurance Coverage Options for Fracking Risks Are
Limited, BUS. INS. (Feb. 24, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.businessinsurance.com/arti
cle/00010101/NEWS06/302249991/Insurance-coverage-options-for-fracking-risks-are-
limited [https://perma.cc/Z9CK-VKE6].
79. Gilbert & Gold, supra note 61.
80. See FREEMAN & KUNREUTHER, supra note 72, at 40–41.
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is outstanding liability uncertainty.81 The liability uncertainty may be
highest in the Marcellus shale area because the case law is particularly
undeveloped and the extent of damages is high as the area is heavily
populated and many people rely on private water wells for drinking
water.82 A few fracking-related water-contamination cases are making
their way through the courts, but none have been decided yet.83 If this
is the source of high premiums, state legislators could cut premiums
by reducing the tort-liability uncertainty through tort reforms that
clarify causation and outline compensable damages. Additionally, the
lack of operating practices that maximize the net benefits of shale de-
velopment could contribute to ambiguity. For example, the senior vice
president of Energi, Inc., an energy insurance provider, has called for
a “more consistent, visible and effective set of best operating prac-
tices” and, in particular, “common agreement among states on a [set
of] best practices” to improve insurance availability.84 Again, here, the
development of net beneficial regulations could reduce these
concerns.
Finally, the insurance market may not function well on its own due
to concerns about adverse selection. Adverse selection occurs when
insurers cannot distinguish between operators that present a high risk
of loss and those who present a low risk of loss and end up offering
both groups insurance coverage at the same price. The riskier opera-
tors are more likely to purchase the insurance, which might cause the
insurer to raise the price, thus further reducing the probability that
less risky firms would purchase insurance. This could lead to a situa-
tion where premiums are high, and many operators do not purchase
insurance.
Once it is clear that the regulatory and tort systems are able to sup-
port the provision and purchase of insurance, states should consider
mandating EIL insurance coverage for operators that drill within their
jurisdictions. Insurance mandates have two direct benefits: they elimi-
nate adverse selection, and they block judgment-proof injurers from
engaging in the activity. Once all firms are required to purchase insur-
ance, the insurer will no longer have to worry about less risky opera-
81. Another source of ambiguity is the scientific uncertainty surrounding some
risk pathways. This uncertainty is most prevalent for Category III and IV risks, and I
do not advocate that operators should be required to purchase insurance to cover
corresponding harms of these risks.
82. This high liability uncertainty may be why only one insurer is known to pro-
vide EIL coverage in the Marcellus shale area (Ironshore), and, based on my conver-
sations with insurers, its premiums are expensive.
83. In one exception, the district judge vacated the jury award and ordered a new
trial. See Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No. 3:09-CV-2284, 2017 WL 1196510, at *1–2
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2017). Other cases are typically dismissed or settled with nondis-
closure agreements. See Blake Watson, Hydraulic Fracturing and Tort Litigation: A
Survey of Landowner Lawsuits, 31 PROB. & PROP. 10, 12 (2017) (providing one
exception).
84. Behr, supra note 70.
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tors opting out. And, if states require the purchase of sufficient
coverage, then only operators able to afford to pay out expected dam-
ages will remain.
So far, not many jurisdictions require insurance for oil and gas oper-
ators.85 And, when they do, state and local governments vary in the
amount of coverage that they mandate and typically only mandate
CGL insurance, which could have several pollution exceptions. Oper-
ators are required to purchase EIL coverage in only one state, Mary-
land, which does not yet allow fracking.86 Maryland requires coverage
of at least $1 million to cover bodily injury, property damage, and
natural resource damage, which includes the costs of cleanup and
remediation caused by the discharge of pollutants.87 The state also
mandates that the insurance be maintained for five years after the well
has been sealed and plugged, and the site has been reclaimed.88
Under an economic framework, variations in the amount of cover-
age may be desirable as different areas may have different expected
damages from accidental pollution discharges. But, all states should
mandate EIL insurance coverage that covers immediate injury, prop-
erty, and cleanup costs from both accidental sudden and gradual re-
leases of pollution—that is, Category I and II risks to water. Policies
should continue to cover only claims made during the policy period,
perhaps within some time window of the incident responsible for the
pollution release. Policies would then incentivize operators to immedi-
ately report spills or leaks to ensure that any resulting damages are
covered by their insurance. Early discovery of pollution releases
would mitigate environmental damages and minimize remedial costs.
But operators should not be required to purchase insurance cover-
age that would cover Category III and IV harms.89 Few insurers would
be willing to underwrite such comprehensive policies given the uncer-
tainty associated with latent harms, and the inclusion of these harms
in coverage would drive up premiums. Professors Dana and Wiseman,
who first discussed the valuable role insurance mandates could play in
the fracking context, disagree; they argue that “insurance markets
have consistently produced adequate insurance capacity once a man-
date was enacted” despite risk uncertainty and predictions to the con-
85. Municipalities such as Arlington, Texas and Fort Worth, Texas, and some
states, including Colorado, Idaho, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, and Oregon, require
insurance coverage. For a more comprehensive overview of local and state efforts, see
Dana & Wiseman, supra note 41, at 1531–32.
86. MD. CODE ANN., Envir. § 14-111(a)(7) (West 2013).
87. Id.
88. Id. § 14-111(b)(1)–(2).
89. An exception to this is the previously discussed requirement for operators to
post assurance bonds to ensure proper well abandonment. See Dana & Wiseman,
supra note 41, at 1562, 1593. Once the operator proves that it has properly plugged
and sealed the well, the operator may retrieve the bond that it posted.
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trary.90 But previous cases where insurers supplied enough insurance
capacity to satisfy demand despite uncertain environmental liability
were characterized by significant tort and regulatory reforms, particu-
larly damage caps.91 These caps made it easier for insurers to price
premiums for uncertain risk pathways.92 Unless state legislatures set
liability caps for damages from accidental pollution releases, then it is
unlikely that many insurers will offer to insure operators against liabil-
ity for later-manifested harms.
C. Plugging Gaps with Regulation
So far, this Article highlights several possible roles for government
intervention to support the already existing risk-mitigation systems:
clarifying liability standards, providing cost-benefit justified regulatory
standards, and mandating insurance. In particular, the Article argues
that these regulations can work together to promote comprehensive
management of Category I and II risks.
Some Category IV risks might also be amenable to cost-benefit jus-
tified regulation. Specifically, for Category IV risks such as future
leaks in disposal wells or improperly plugged abandoned wells,93 regu-
lators could require companies to post assurance bonds at well com-
pletion.94 Once the operator proves that it has implemented cost-
effective features to ensure that the wells are unlikely to leak, the op-
erator may retrieve the bond that it posted. The bond would thus
counteract the incentive for companies to simply abandon or improp-
erly seal wells once drilling or disposal is complete.
Generally speaking, however, it would be difficult for regulators to
assess the benefits and costs of risk-mitigation strategies to manage
Category III risks and some Category IV risks, specifically those that
manifest in the future through highly uncertain pathways. Because
harms are yet to manifest (if they manifest at all), the calculation of
90. Id. at 1573.
91. To support their claims, Dana and Wiseman refer to the $1.5 billion in insur-
ance capacity generated in response to a de facto insurance mandate on offshore oil
shippers and drilling operators. Id. at 1574. But, the federal liability scheme for off-
shore drilling, see generally 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2012); 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–61 (2012), im-
poses a maximum liability cap that depends on the facility, typically removal costs
plus $75 million, see 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (2012) (which applies to offshore facilities,
excluding deepwater ports). Of course, as the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon disaster
demonstrated, these insurance limits can be far too low to compensate victims and
remediate the environment in the case of large spills. I discuss the possibility of cata-
strophic damages in the next Section.
92. For example, the federal government has mandated insurance for owners of
nuclear plants with limited private liability. NUCLEAR INSURANCE AND DISASTER RE-
LIEF, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N (2018), https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0327/
ML032730606.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ2E-VKDC] [hereinafter NRC FACT SHEET].
93. These harms do not manifest later, but rather, they may actually occur later if
proper precautions are not taken in advance.
94. See Dana & Wiseman, supra note 41, at 1526–27 (proposing this solution).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-1\TWL108.txt unknown Seq: 26 19-DEC-18 9:13
54 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
benefits of specialized risk-mitigation strategies would be a specula-
tive venture. Command-and-control regulations, the most common
form of state regulations,95 are particularly unlikely to provide the
flexibility necessary for regulators to adapt to new information on
these risks and the magnitude of harms. Such inflexible regulations
could also hinder technological innovation, which is key to the success
of the oil and gas industry.
In these circumstances, regulators generally have two options: err
on the side of caution and either prohibit or significantly reduce the
extent of shale development with stringent regulation; or regulate
known risks with cost-benefit justified regulations now and learn
about the uncertain risks as development unfolds. The first option is
embodied in the precautionary principle, which states that those want-
ing to take an action bear the burden of proving that the action does
not create a risk of harm to the public or the environment. This princi-
ple is often thought to be too strong, prohibiting many net-beneficial
actions. In the context of shale development, at least based on the
currently available information, the second option is preferable.96
The second option is only reasonable, however, if researchers ac-
tively monitor and investigate the uncertain Category III and IV risks
to water. Operators likely will not have adequate incentives to investi-
gate the nature of uncertain pathways and latent harms. By definition,
these harms manifest later, so operators would have to anticipate fu-
ture tort liability to invest in this research now.97 Tort litigation could
help though—as cases enter the system, large judgments against oper-
ators may mobilize research.98 But in the short term, the government
would have to either incentivize research or conduct its own research
into latent harms and uncertain pathways in order to respond appro-
priately as soon as information is available.
These tasks would be most efficiently accomplished at the federal
level to avoid repetition and to take advantage of considerable re-
95. Currently, more than 80% of state regulations are command-and-control regu-
lations, and about 1% are flexible performance standards. See RICHARDSON ET AL.,
supra note 40, at 14. The rest rely on case-by-case permitting and other methods. Id.
96. There are circumstances, however, where caution is ideal. For example, Arrow
and Fisher find that it might be optimal to err on the side of underdevelopment of a
resource if development of the resource would cause irreversible environmental harm
or if preservation of the resource is likely to have a high value in the future. See
Kenneth J. Arrow & Anthony C. Fisher, Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty,
and Irreversibility, 88 Q.J. ECON. 312, 313–14 (1974). In the case of contamination
risks to water from shale development, current evidence does not suggest that con-
tamination would be irreversible, though it might be costly to clean up contaminated
water sources.
97. Some tort plaintiffs alleging immediate harms from adverse well events are
also calling for medical monitoring costs and, if successful, might later hold operators
responsible for latent health harms. For example, see Strudley v. Antero Res. Corp.,
350 P.3d 874 (Colo. App. 2013).
98. See Hersch, supra note 67.
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sources, but if an enhanced federal role is unlikely at this time, then
states could take up this research role. For example, the government
could require operators to invest a certain amount into research con-
ducted by neutral scientific or research bodies. The government could
also use taxes on the oil and gas industry to pay for the costs of con-
ducting this research itself. Research could range from passive health
monitoring of specific populations exposed to a major pollution event
to active testing of uncertain risk pathways. For example, the U.S. De-
partment of Energy injected fracking fluid with tracer chemicals into a
drilling site in order to monitor the process of the fluid over several
years.99 Similar projects could occur at different shale formations and
provide useful information to regulators, the public, and courts. When
given the appropriate weight, the information could help set future
regulatory standards and verify causation in tort. If governments are
concerned about having money available to address these latent
harms in the future, then they could apply a portion of regulatory
fines to form a fund. This fund could be used in the future to remedi-
ate the environment and compensate victims when those responsible
for latent-manifesting contamination are unable to pay.100 Financing
the fund with a percentage of fines collected each year would also add
a fault element; those responsible for the worst violations would con-
tribute a larger amount of money to the fund.
Finally, managing the possibility of catastrophic damages from shale
development would require even more specialized attention. If a low-
probability risk of catastrophic damages manifests, the injurer is un-
likely to have the financial resources to pay for damages, even in a
regulatory system that requires operators to carry insurance that
would cover expected damages. Current research has not found shale
development to be associated with such risks.101 But states concerned
about low-probability catastrophic damages of shale development
could look to the proposals for creating a system to cover catastrophic
damages from offshore drilling accidents. Many of these proposals
were generated in the wake of the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon disas-
ter that highlighted the inadequacy of the regulatory regime for off-
shore drilling in dealing with spills of that magnitude. Insights from
these proposals could be applied to onshore shale development.102
99. Kevin Begos, DOE Study: Fracking Chemicals Didn’t Taint Water, USA TO-
DAY (July 19, 2013, 10:23 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/
07/19/doe-study-fracking-didnt-taint/2567721/ [https://perma.cc/XY6D-QLWD].
100. Ideally, health insurance would cover latent health risks to individuals.
101. That is not to say that such risks are impossible, especially through some of the
uncertain risk pathways.
102. For several proposals detailing schemes that would cover damages from off-
shore drilling accidents generated in the wake of the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon
disaster, see W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Deterring and Compensating
Oil-Spill Catastrophes: The Need for Strict and Two-Tier Liability, 64 VAND. L. REV.
1717, 1722–25 (2011); Mark A. Cohen et al., Deepwater Drilling: Law, Policy, and
Economics of Firm Organization and Safety, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1853, 1857 (2011). Of
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V. CONCLUSION
The fracking context is characterized by a variety of risks, some
known and some unknown. States, responsible for managing these
risks, have generally adopted one of two responses: (1) conducting
business-as-usual and employing the same regulations for shale devel-
opment as for conventional drilling; or (2) banning (or allowing locali-
ties to ban) fracking altogether. Few states have evaluated the new
challenges associated with shale development and updated their regu-
lations accordingly.103
Additional government intervention should not be undertaken
lightly, especially in an industry characterized by fast-paced innova-
tion and technological change. But if adequate attention is placed on
risks, incentives, and cost-benefit analysis, then it is possible for gov-
ernment regulation to supplement market-based or voluntary risk-
mitigation systems to improve aggregate welfare. This Article applies
these principles to regulating shale development. It highlights how
tort, insurance, and regulatory systems interact with each other and
identifies risk-mitigation gaps that governments could address. Below,
Figure 4 summarizes the tools that regulators should prioritize for
each risk category.
FIGURE 4
Prioritizing Regulatory Tools by Risk Category
Category Category Category Category
I II III IV
Some:
Net-Beneficial Regulation YES YES NO YES
Research Investments NO NO YES YES
Tort Liability Standards YES YES YES YES
Insurance Mandates (EIL) YES YES NO NO
Assurance Bonds NO NO YES YES
Notes. EIL refers to environmental impairment liability insurance plans. See text for details.
Category I and II risks manifest in immediate harms to water
sources. These risks are not very different from the risks to water
course, in the case of fracking, the worst-case scenario damages would be different
than those for offshore drilling, and these damages could vary by shale formation.
States could also require all operators to maintain separate, additional insurance cov-
erage that would be activated should any operator cause catastrophic damages above
an individual liability cap. For example, claims resulting from nuclear accidents are
covered under the Price-Anderson Act, which mandates an individual “first tier” level
of insurance for owners of nuclear power plants and generates a plan for obtaining
additional funds from insurers in the case of severe accidents. NRC FACT SHEET,
supra note 92.
103. Exceptions might include Pennsylvania and New York, before its ban, at least
to some extent.
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presented by all onshore drilling activities, not just shale development.
Regulators should require operators to adopt all risk-mitigating oper-
ating practices that generate net benefits. Strict liability for drilling
harms will also motivate operators to adopt these practices, especially
if legislative and regulatory interventions facilitate recovery for actual
drilling-related harms. Mandatory insurance coverage for Category I
and II risks will then guarantee that only operators that are able to
pay for expected immediate harms (reasonable care notwithstanding)
engage in drilling activities. Net beneficial regulations, an adequate
enforcement system, and robust tort litigation will ensure that opera-
tors continue to adopt all net-beneficial risk mitigation operating
practices.
States should recognize that such strategies, however, are unlikely
to address those Category III and IV risks that are characterized by
uncertain pathways and latent harms. Regulators should encourage
research now to learn more about these risks. By being proactive, reg-
ulators can amass scientific data and update regulations in a timely
manner and in an appropriate way given the information. Tort litiga-
tion would still function as a backstop motivating force.
By applying principles of risk, incentives, and cost-benefit analysis,
state governments can facilitate responsible shale development by cre-
ating incentives for optimal activity levels, acceptable risk-taking, and
comprehensive environmental protection. In general, these principles
will ensure that regulators identify combinations of tools that effec-
tively achieve environmental goals.
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